The Morgan Report 1991: Crime prevention strategies

The Morgan Report 1991 aversion legal profession strategiesThe Morgan cover of 1991 identified the local anaesthetic anaesthetic authority as world primordial to the delivery of detestation taproom scheme. How successful pay local organisation in fact proved to be in implementing this strategy?There stern be little doubt that wickedness and disgust taproom strategies ar two of the most socio- semipolitical important issues facing Britain in the contemporary era. The crime prevention strategies that were in place for the vast majority of the twentieth century were established to spile with nineteenth century well-disposed and political problems pertaining to urban expansion itself a direct cause of industrialization and the expansion of technology in the Victorian era (Elmsley, 200366-84). Yet the neighborly and political problems facing late twentieth century and early 20 first century pose new logistical problems that old and modify crime prevention stra tegies shake proved un suitable to solve. Globalisation, migration and the triumph of well-favored political ideology shit all conspired to radically alter the pattern not that of policing but withal of human rights. This, in turn, has had a major effect upon the performance of crime prevention strategies most notably with regards to the de-centralisation of policing. It is the aim of the following es suppose to analyse the consequences of this shift from central to local decl are with regards to the delivery of crime prevention strategies in modern Britain. ahead we can commence our analysis, though, we need to look at the specific polity context in order to establish a excogitationual fabric for the remainder of the discussion.Although the de-centralisation of policing was officially enshrined in the aversion and trouble oneself Act of 1998, the pulsing behind this reform was located in the Morgan Report of 1991, which was set up by the Home short letter to look a t the delivery of local crime prevention strategies. The subsequent report made two recommendations that have since formed the backb superstar of the central presidencys anti-crime and disorder apostrophize. Firstly, the report recommended the implementation of the two concepts of community safety and (increasingly) crime and disorder reduction to signify a comprehensive and targeted local approach to crime control (Hughes and Edwards, 200519). Secondly, the report recommended that the present establish a clear statutory indebtedness for local authorities constituting the genesis of the multi-agency, partnership approach to crime prevention.This, then, is the descent of the de-centralisation of policing and crime prevention with local authorities existence charged with taking a more hands-on role with regards to policing in the context of slight high-risk crime such(prenominal) as youth crime and genial disorder with the state remaining responsible for the policing of mo re high-risk crimes such as the contemporary war against terrorism. As Anthony Giddens (the chief friendly form _or_ system of governance advisor to the Blair government afterward parvenu savvy first came to forcefulness in 1997) duly broadsides, professional policing involves mainly concentrating on serious issues (Giddens, 199888). Thus, although the large-minded of policing envisaged for local authorities remained very professional in focus after 1998, we should also be aware that the local authority was expected to deal with the little serious issues facing contemporary crime. As such speckle we should interpret local authorities as indeed being central to crime prevention we should take care to beneathstand the nature of the crimes that these authorities were expected to assist preventing. It should also be noted that this development did not constitute a United States style federal or quasi-federal approach to crime prevention in modern day Britain. Rather, the Hom e spot and the Home Secretary remain the key centres of arbitrary legal and political power with regards to the implementation of crime prevention strategies in the UK and decisions interpreted by these centralised bodies remain the definitive ruling in all wrong proceedings. This is an important refer to remember when attempting to deduce the ultimate success or failure of local authorities in reducing crime and social disorder. As is the case with education and health care, the New Labour government can be seen to have presided over a situation lift out characterised as constitution overkill creating conflicting spheres of interest and influence with regards to social policy without necessarily go anything substantial or new (Fulbrook, 2001243-259).It is essential, thitherfore, to understand that the increase relevance that has been attached to statutory local authorities is part of the governments broader strategy of initiating multi-agency partnerships between public sec tor services (such as local authorities), private enterprises and public initiatives (such as community watch or neighbourhood management). In possibility, these multi-agency partnerships should involve a free exchange of ideas between each of the public, private and volunteer sectors, mirroring the popular environment in which they have all been conceived. In this way, it is hoped crime can be tackled by utilising the logistical resources of the state, the financial resources of business and the knowledge-based resources of local communities. However, as Gordon Hughes (199876) observes, the reality has tended to be less a reflection of democratic ideals and more a manifestation of corporal ethos with the concept of both multi-agency and the community lost within the broader parameters of the de-centralisation of policing and anti-crime powers.This slippage between the footing multi-agency and community is somewhat problematic. It glosses over the key feature of multi-agency crim e prevention which is that it is chiefly a fade-down, neo-corporatist strategy from both central and local state regimes. In this strategy situational crime prevention techniques predominate and thither is minimal bottom-up communal participation and minimal popular democratic ownership.This is an important point to remember and genius that has a direct collision upon the limitations of local authorities with regards to effectively delivering crime prevention measures. Because of the two-tier structure of the multi-agency partnerships whereby the keen of private enterprise and the political capital of the public sector are elevated over and above the grass roots advice of community leadership and neighbourhood managers local authorities are frequently unable to train local policies that are devised to combat crime within any one specific local authority. Dialogue between the agencies is in galore(postnominal) cases limited. This clear impacts upon the ability of local auth orities with regards to fighting crime as the urge behind crime prevention strategies remains rooted in the top tier of decision and policy making, located at central government and think-tank level. Moreover, where there is dialogue between the often competing agencies involved within the multi-agency framework, the delivery is shrouded in protocol characterised by excessive paperwork, red tape and bureaucracy. The abhorrence and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) initiative, for instance, dedicates little attention to implementing crime prevention strategies, preferring to gift more time to analysing and developing strategic assessments to use as supposed withallkits in the fight against crime and social disorder (Home agency, 2007).We should consequently note the way in which the existence of the partnership strategies themselves, coupled with the policy overkill of the New Labour government, has directly contributed to excessive red tape and bureaucracy at the exact m oment when greater initiative needs to be taken at a grass roots level. Until this underlying chasm between theory and practice has been bridged, we ought to expect local authorities to continue to deliver crime prevention strategies that are wholly out of synch with the social realities of policing everyday manner in a diverse, multicultural society (Clements, 2008).None of this, we should note, is to conclusively state that the decentralisation of crime prevention strategies has been a failure throughout Britain. Rather, the point being highlighted above has been that the partnership scheme comes with inherent structural weaknesses that cannot succor but hinder the broader initiative of tackling crime. However, measuring in real name the ultimate success or failure of local authorities drives to disregard crime is also an inherently difficult task. Not only are facts and figures manipulated by both the local authorities themselves, the mass medias blood-and-guts interest in crime and social disorder as a mainstream journalistic story means that facts and figures are similarly manipulated by the media in order to sensationalise a story (Jewkes, 2004). The mass medias over-riding commercial longing to sell a story completely negates any sense of unbiased, unsophisticated journalistic integrity. Thus, much in the same way as the neo-corporatist undertide pervades through the two-tier structure of multi-agency partnerships in the community so the same corporatist, capitalistic dimension affects the measurement of success or failure with regards to crime prevention strategies.We must also take note of the way in which statistics can trick the spectator orthogonal of the ideological parameters of political engineering and outside of the sphere of influence of the global mass media. For instance, the statistics for all crime committed in England and Wales appears to show a clear reduction in the moment of crimes being committed per one thousand persons with the figure falling from 26.4 per one thousand people between April and June 2005 to 24.9 per one thousand people between January and March 2006 (Home Office Website first accessed 10.06.08). These crimes, though, cover the entire spectrum of criminality with many of these crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Home Office and the Home Secretary. specialized target groups such as young offenders, on the other hand, have witnessed vast increases in the numbers of crimes being committed since the Morgan Report and the implementation of the law-breaking and Disorder Act. The UK charity TheSite.org (first accessed 11.06.08) notes how the number of fifteen to seventeen yr olds currently being held in custody has doubled in the in conclusion ten years. All of these figures are easy to manipulate and rather than offering conclusive evidence as to the success or failure of the multi-agency initiative, these figures only serve to further cloud the reality of devolution of crim e prevention strategies in contemporary Britain. ConclusionThe recommendations contained with the Morgan Report, in addition to the Crime and Disorder Act in which these recommendations were encapsulated, were correct in citing the need to expand the concept of crime prevention to incorporate local authorities. Furthermore, because of the nature of power in a social democracy in the contemporary era, this shift from voluntary to statutory status, incorporating a multi-agency approach, was also a necessary move (Phillips, 2001163-181).However, as we have seen, this multi-agency approach has predominantly conspired to further cloud what were already opaque issues with regards to responsibility, accountability and the implementation of the broader anti-crime strategy. Not only has bureaucratic procedure hampered the parade of cooperation and conciliation between the private, pubic and voluntary sectors that make up these multi-agencies, there has also been a lack of foresight with re gards to the arbitration of political and discriminatory power. For instance, where the local authorities are expected to initiate measures to tackle such measures as anti-social behaviour, it is the centralised state that continues to set the quotas with regards to immigration figures, housing as well as setting the budget which decides the amount of jurisprudencemen that are able to patrol the streets. The recent strike over police pay highlights the determine to which local authorities hands are tied when it comes to tackling crime at a regional level. Furthermore, the lack of communication recently exposed with regards to the police and hospitals over the release of the number of victims being admitted with stab wounds further underscores the acres that needs to be made up before we can say that the local authorities are truly in charge of tackling crime in contemporary, decentralised Britain.Consequently, we need to acknowledge first and foremost the structural weaknesses inherent in the multi-agency approach to crime prevention. Furthermore, we need to acknowledge the chop-chop changing nature not only of crime but also of society in the twenty first century and the impact that this is bound to continue to have upon contemporary policing methods. It is, in the final analysis, much too soon to attempt proclaim the ultimate success or failure of a project that should still be understood as being in its embryonic stage.ReferencesAll Crime Statistics for England and Wales, April 2005 to March 2006, in, Home Office Website http//www.crimestatistics.org.uk/tool/Clements, P. (2008) Policing a Diverse Society Second Edition Oxford Oxford University expressDeveloping a Strategic Assessment An Effective Practice Toolkit for Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships and Community precaution Partnerships (2007) London The Home OfficeElmsley, C. (2003) The Birth and Development of the Police, in, Newburn, T. (Ed.) A Handbook of Policing Uffculme Willan Publis hingFulbrook, J. (2001) New Labours Welfare Reforms Anything New? , in, The Modern Law Review, Volume 64, scrap 2, 243-259Giddens, A. (1998) The Third Way The Renewal of Social Democracy Cambridge Polity raise upHughes, G. (1998) Understanding Crime Prevention Social Control, Risk and Late contemporaneity Maidenhead The Open University PressHughes, G. and Edwards, A. (2005) Crime Prevention in Context, in, Tilly, N. (Ed.) A Handbook of Crime Prevention and Community Safety Uffculme Willan PublishingJewkes, Y. (2004) Media and Crime A Critical Introduction London and New York SagePhillips, C. (2001) From free to Statutory Status Reflecting on the Experience of Three Partnerships Established under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, in, Hughes, G., McLaughlin, E. and Muncie, J. (Eds.) Crime Prevention and Community Safety New Directions London and New York SageYoung Offenders, in, The Site.Org Website http//www.thesite.org/homelawandmoney/law/introuble/youngoffenders